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ABSTRACT
This paper considers a novel approach to scalable mul-
tiagent resource allocation in dynamic settings. We
propose an approximate solution in which each resource
consumer is represented by an independent MDP-based
agent that models expected utility using an average
model of its expected access to resources given only
limited information about all other agents. A global
auction-based mechanism is proposed for allocations
based on expected regret. We assume truthful bidding
and a cooperative coordination mechanism, as we are
considering healthcare scenarios. We illustrate the per-
formance of our coordinated MDP approach against
a Monte-Carlo based planning algorithm intended for
large-scale applications, as well as other approaches
suitable for allocating medical resources. The evalua-
tions show that the global utility value across all con-
sumer agents is closer to optimal when using our algo-
rithms under certain time constraints, with low compu-
tational cost. As such, we offer a promising approach
for addressing complex resource allocation problems
that arise in healthcare settings.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems
General Terms
Algorithm, Experimentation
Keywords
Multiagent Planning, Multiagent MDP, Healthcare Applications
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper develops an approach for allocating resources in mul-
tiagent systems for domains where there are multiple agents and
multiple tasks, and the success of the agents carrying out tasks is
dependent stochastically on their ability to obtain a sequence of re-
sources over time. We are particularly interested in situations where
agents must independently optimize over their individual states,
actions, and utilities, but must also solve a complex coordination
problem with other agents in the usage of limited resources.
Appears in The Eighth Annual Workshop on Multiagent Sequential
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In particular, we are concerned with allocating resources in set-
tings that involve a set of N consumers, each of whom requires
some subset of a total of M resources. The consumers each have a
measure of health1 that they are trying to optimize, and this qual-
ity is influenced stochastically by the resources they acquire and by
time. Further, each consumer has a resource pathway that repre-
sents the partial ordering in which they need the resources. Con-
sumers’ states evolve independently over time, and are dependent
only through their need for shared resources. Rewards are inde-
pendent, and the global reward is the sum of individual consumer
rewards.
We formulate this problem as a factored multiagent Markov De-
cision Process (MMDP) with explicit features for each consumer’s
state and resource utilization, and an explicit model of how each
consumer’s state progresses stochastically over time dependent on
obtained resources. The actions are the possible allocations of re-
sources in each time step. For realistic numbers of consumers and
resources, however, such an MMDP has a state and action space
that precludes computation of an optimal policy. This paper ad-
dresses this problem and makes three contributions:
1. We develop an approximate distributed approach, where the
full MMDP is broken into N MDPs, one for each consumer.
We call these consumer MDPs agents. Agents model the
resources they expect to obtain using a probability distribu-
tion derived from average statistics of the other agents, and
compute expected regret based on this distribution and on the
known dynamics of their health state.
2. We propose an iterative auction-based mechanism for real-
time resource allocation based on the agents’ individual ex-
pected regret values. The iterative nature of this process en-
sures a reasonable allocation at minimal computational cost.
3. We demonstrate the advantages of our approach in a coop-
erative healthcare domain with patients seeking doctors and
equipment in order to improve their health states. We present
averages of simulations using randomly generated agents from
a reasonable prior distribution. We compare our coordinated
MDP approach against an alternate planning algorithm in-
tended for large-scale applications, a state-of-the-art Monte
Carlo sampling based method for solving the full MMDP
model known as UCT. We also compare to two simple but re-
alistic heuristic approaches for allocating medical resources.
Our approach is particularly well suited to large collaborative do-
mains that require rapid responses to resource allocation demands
1We use the term health here in a general sense to denote a single
quantity over which an agent’s utility function (and hence, its re-
ward) is defined. This can be for e.g. quality of a solution, value of
an outcome, or patient state of health.
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in time-critical domains, and we use a healthcare scenario through-
out the paper to clarify our solution. We start by introducing the
MMDP model and our distributed approach, followed by descrip-
tions of the baseline methods we compare to. We then develop a set
of realistic models for use in simulation, and show results across a
range of problem sizes.
2. MDPS AND COORDINATION
Our model is a factored MDP represented as a tuple of elements
〈N,M, τ,R,H, PT ,Φ, A〉 where N is the number of consumers,
M the number of resources, and τ is the planning horizon. R =
{R1, . . . ,RN}is a finite set of resource variables, each one repre-
senting the state of a single consumer’s resource utilizations, where
Ri = {Ri1, Ri2, . . . , RiM} is a set of variables representing con-
sumer i’s utilization of resource j. Each Rij ∈ R where R is
the set of possible resource utilizations (how much resource is be-
ing used). We model each resource as distinct (so multiple copies
of a resource are modeled separately). H = {H1, . . . , HN} is
a set of N variables measuring each consumer’s health, each of
which is Hi ∈ H giving the different levels of health. We use
si = {Ri, Hi} to denote the complete set of state variables for
consumer i, and S : (s1, ..., sN ) to denote the complete state for
all consumers. Agent i receives a reward of Φi(si, s′i) for transi-
tion from si to s′i, thus the multiagent system’s reward function
is Φ(S, S′) =
∑
i Φi(si, s
′
i). The transition model is defined as
PT (S
′|S,A) = ∏i Pi(s′i|si, ai), which denotes the probability
of reaching joint state S′ when in joint state S, and A is a set of
permissible actions, one for each resource and each consumer rep-
resenting all feasible allocations of resources (so the same resource
cannot be allocated to two agents simultaneously). Resources are
deterministic given the actions, and only one resource can be al-
located to each consumer at a time. We assume a finite horizon
undiscounted setting2.
The full MDP as described is an instance of a multiagent MDP
(MMDP), and will be very challenging to solve optimally for rea-
sonable numbers of consumers and resources. The total number of
states is |S| = |H|N |R|MN , and the number of actions is N !
(N−M)! .
We will show how to compute approximate (sample-based) solu-
tions later in this paper, but first we show our approach to distribut-
ing this large MDP into N smaller MDPs, and introduce our coor-
dination mechanism for computing approximate allocations.
Figure 1: A patient’s MDP with 3 resources shown as a two time
slice influence diagram
We treat each consumer’s MDP as independent (an agent), an
2This is realistic in healthcare scenarios as health states do not war-
rant discounting.
example of which is shown in Figure 1. We assume that the agent’s
state spaces, resource utilizations, health states, transition and re-
ward functions are independent. The agents are only dependent
through their shared usage of resources: only feasible allocations
are permitted as described above (agents can’t simultaneously share
resources). Rewards are additive and each agent’s actions now be-
come requests for resources as described below. We make two
further assumptions. First, the reward function for each agent is
dependent on the agent’s health, H, and is set to zero by a boolean
factor at the end of resource acquisition (finishing the medical path-
way by receiving all required resources). Second, the agent health
(H) is conditionally independent of the agent action given the cur-
rent resources and the previous health, and the agent actions only
influence the resource allocation, since the agent can only influence
health indirectly by bidding for resources. Thus, for each agent i,
Pi(r
′, h′|r, h, a) factors as
Pi(r
′, h′|r, h, a) = Pi(r′|r, h, a)Pi(h′|r, h) (1)
where we define ΛR ≡ Pi(r′|r, h, a) is the probability of getting
the next set of resources given the current health, resources, and
action, and ΩH ≡ Pi(h′|r, h) is a dynamic model for the agent’s
health rate. We will refer to ΛR as the resource obtention model
and to ΩH as the health progression model.
Health progression is a property of a particular agent’s condition
or task and can be estimated from global statistics about the nature
of the conditions (e.g. diseases). ΩH must be elicited from prior
knowledge about diseases and treatments, and so forms part of a
disease model that we henceforth assume is pre-defined (manually,
or by learning based on historical statistics). On the other hand,
the resource obtention model, ΛR, will be dependent on the cur-
rent state of the multiagent system, and is a property of how we are
setting up our resource allocation mechanism and the expected re-
gret computations of each agent. For example, the probability of a
single agent obtaining a resource will depend on (i) the number of
other agents currently bidding for that resource and (ii) the agent’s
model of health.
If using a single MDP for all agents as described at the start of
this section, then resources would be deterministic given a joint
allocation action. If modeled as a decentralized POMDP, the re-
sources for each consumer would be conditioned on the unobserv-
able states and actions of all the other consumers. In our model,
we assume that the probability of obtaining a certain resource can
be approximated reasonably well, either as a proior model based
on the known distribution of diseases and the known requirements
for treatments of each disease, or as a learned distribution based on
simulated or real experiments.
In general, we can make no assumptions about further condi-
tional independencies in the resource allocation factor. That is,
the probability of obtaining a resource R′ at time t may depend
stochastically on the set of resources at time t − 1. However, in
many domains, there may be further independencies that can be
encoded in the model. For example, in Figure 1, resource R′i is
conditionally independent of all resources Rj where j /∈ {i, i− 1}
(for i > 1) and for j /∈ {i} (for i = 1), so the resources are ordered
according to the (linear) medical pathway of this particular patient.
We assume that the health progression factor can be specified for
each agent independently of the other agents.
A policy for each individual MDP is a function pii(si) 7→ Ai that
gives an action for an agent to take in each state si. The policy can
be obtained by computing a value function V ∗i (si) for each state
si ∈ Si, that is maximal for each state (i.e. satisfies the Bellman
equation [2]). For simplicity of notation, we remove agent indices
and only show the indices for resources. Thus an individual agent’s
value function is represented as:
V ∗(s) = max
a
γ
∑
s′∈S
[Φ(s, s′) + P (s′|s, a)V ∗(s′)] (2)
The policy is then given by the actions at each state that are the
arguments of the maximization in Equation 2.
Agents compute their expected regret for not obtaining a given
resource as follows. The expected value, Qi(h, r, ai) for being in
health state h with resources r at time t, bidding for (denoted ai)
and receiving resource ri at time t+ 1 is:
Qi ≡
∑
r′−i
∑
h′
P (h′|h, r)V (r′i, r′−i, h′)δ(r−i, r′−i)
where r−i is the set of all resources except ri and δ(x, y) = 1 ↔
x = y and 0 otherwise. The equivalent value for not receiving the
resource, Q¯i(h, r, ai), is
Q¯i ≡
∑
r′−i
∑
h′
P (h′|h, r)V¯ (r¯′i, r′−i, h′)δ(r−i, r′−i)
Thus, the expected regret for not receiving resource ri when in
h with resources r and taking action ai is:
Ri(h, r, ai) = Qi − Q¯i (3)
We also refer to this as the expected benefit of receiving ri. It
is important for agents in this setting to consider regret (or bene-
fit) instead of value, as two agents may value a resource the same,
but one might depend on it much more (e.g. have no other option).
Value-based bids will fail to communicate this important informa-
tion to the allocation mechanism.
Note that Q is an optimistic estimate, since the expected value
assumes the optimal policy can be followed after a single time step
(which is untrue). This myopic approximation enables us to com-
pute on-line allocations of resources in the complete multiagent
problem, as described in the next section. In the following, we
will use the notion of utilitarian social welfare by aggregating the
total rewards amongst all agents as an evaluation measure.
2.1 Coordination Mechanism
A coordination mechanism must aim to respect the health needs
of the patients to maximize the overall utility. Each agent estimates
its expected individual regret given its estimate of future resources
and health (as given by ΛR and ΩH ). The regret values of different
agents are compared globally, and an allocation is sought that min-
imizes the global regret. While the final allocation decisions are
made greedily in the action-selection phase, the reported expected
values of regret (for bidding) consider future rewards.
To implement this allocation, we use an iterative auction-like
procedure, in which each consumer bids on the resource with high-
est regret. The highest bidder gets the resource, and all other agents
bid on their next highest regret resource. Agents can also resign,
receive no resources for one time step, and try again in a future time
step.
2.2 Example
Consider a simplified scenario with 4 agents and 4 resources.
We are assuming that agents require all four resources and the ex-
pected benefits for receiving resources (or regrets for not receiving
resources) based on their internal utility function have been calcu-
lated as illustrated in Table 1. The worst-case scenario would be
when all the agents have attributed higher benefits to the same re-
sources, so that their desire to acquire resources is in the same order
or preference.
Agents r1 r2 r3 r4
a1 *7 8 9 10
a2 1 3 *6 7
a3 3 *4 5 6
a4 5 6 7 *8
(a) Worst-case
Agents r1 r2 r3 r4
a1 3 8 *9 10
a2 1 3 6 *7
a3 *6 4 5 3
a4 5 *6 7 8
(b) Average-case
Table 1: Example scenarios: 4 agents and 4 resources. *X shows
the optimal allocation, while X shows our method.
Agents first try to acquire the resource with highest benefit. In
this scenario, all agents have associated the highest benefit to r4,
however, only one (a1) would be successful in getting it. All agents
who have lost the previous auction, will now bid for the resource
with the second-highest benefit, and so on. In this case, agents a2,
a2, a3 all have attributed r3 as their second highest. Our auction-
based method gives a benefit of 22 (shown in bold in Table 1a).
The optimal allocation has the benefit of 25 (one shown with * in
Table 1a).
Table 1b shows an average-case scenario. Again we are assum-
ing all agents require all the resources but with more diverse pref-
erences over the set of resources. Our method gets a benefit of 26
compared to the optimal benefit of 28.
3. BASELINE SOLUTION METHODS
3.1 Sample-Based
We will compare our algorithm to the result of a sample-based
solution on the full MMDP as described at the start of this section.
UCT is a rollout-based Monte Carlo planning algorithm [11] where
the MDP is simulated to a certain horizon many times, and the aver-
age rewards gathered are used to select the best action to take next.
To balance between exploration and exploitation, UCT chooses an
action by modeling an independent multi-armed bandit problem
considering the number of times the current node and its chosen
child node has been visited according to the UCB1 policy [1]. In
general, UCT can be considered as an any-time algorithm and will
converge to the optimal solution given sufficient time and memory
[11]. UCT has become the gold standard for Monte-Carlo based
planning in Markov decision processes [10].
To rollout at each state, we use a uniform random action selection
from the set of permissible actions at each state. The permissible
actions are the ones that do not cause any conflict over resource
acquisition. Subsequently, the best action is then chosen based on
the UCB1 policy. The amount of time UCT uses for rollouts is the
timeout, and is a parameter that we must set carefully in our experi-
ments, as it directly impacts the value of the sample-based solution.
Although in some resource allocation settings lengthy decision pe-
riods would not have any impact on the efficiency of allocations, ar-
guably, the time for making allocation decisions can be important
in domains requiring urgent decisions such as emergency depart-
ments and environments exposed to significant change. Delayed
decisions for critical patients with acute conditions in emergency
departments can have huge impact on effectiveness of treatments
[6]. Moreover, the allocation solution may become useless by the
time an optimal decision is computed as a result of fluctuations in
demand, and hence, requires recomputing the allocation decision.
We will compare to UCT using a number of different realistic time-
out settings.
3.2 Heuristic methods
We use three heuristic methods. In the first, only the agent’s
level of criticality is considered (we call this “sickest first”). In the
second, we use the reported regret values and only run one round of
the auction-based allocation (so only one agent gets a resource at
each time step: the agent with the biggest regret for not getting it).
In the third, patients are treated in the order they arrive (first-come,
first-served or FCFS - a traditional healthcare method).
4. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We demonstrate our approach in simulations with realistic prob-
abilistic models of different conditions (e.g. diseases) and health
and resource dynamics distributions. The simulations use a random
sampling of agent MDPs, drawn from a realistic prior distribution
over these models. It is important to note that we are not simply
defining a single patient MDP, but rather our results are averages
over randomly drawn MDPs: each simulated patient is different in
each simulation, but drawn from the same underlying distribution.
We make three main assumptions. First, we assume that task
durations are identical (e.g. it always takes one unit of time to con-
sume each resource). The second assumption is that each agent is
only able to bid on a single resource at each bidding round (but each
bidding round includes a sequence of bids to determine the action
for each MDP). The third assumption is that all patients arrive at
the same time.
4.1 Agent Setup
We assume that the health variableH ∈ {healthy, sick, critical},
and each resource variable Ri ∈ {have, had, need}. Patients all
start (enter the hospital) with H = sick and, depending on the
resources they acquire, their health state improves to healthy or de-
grades to the critical condition. We further define a function to
encode the states of the health variables as ν(h) = {0, 1, 2} for
h = {healthy, sick, critical}. We assume that there areD possi-
ble conditions (diseases), each with a criticality level, a real number
cd ∈ [1, 2] with cd = 2 being the most critical disease (makes the
patient become sicker faster).
We first assume a multinomial distribution over theD conditions
drawn from a set D, such that each patient has condition d ∈ D
with probability φd(d). In the following, we assume conditions to
be evenly distributed: φd(d) = 1/|D|, although in practice this
distribution would reflect the current condition distribution in the
population, community or hospital. Each condition has a condition
profile that specifies a set of resources in a specific order that is
derived from the clinical practice guidelines or the medical path-
way, a distribution over health state progression models, ΩH , and
a distribution over resource obtention models, ΛR.
The medical pathway can be specified either within the ΩH (by
making any set of r not on the pathway lead to non-progression
of the health state), or within ΛR (by making it impossible to get
resource allocations outside the pathway). We choose the latter
in these experiments, but in practice the pathway may need to be
specified by a combination of both, particularly if there is non-
determinism in the pathways (i.e. different pathways can be chosen
with different predicted outcomes). We assume that pathways for
all agents are a linear chain through the required resources for each
condition.
For our experiments, we have built priors over ΩH and ΛR based
on our prior knowledge of the health domain. We have made these
priors reasonably realistic (capture some of the main properties of
this domain), and sufficiently non-specific to allow for a wide range
of randomly drawn transition functions in the patient MDPs. In
practice, these priors would be elicited from experts or learned from
data.
Health state progression model: For each simulated agent, ΩH
is drawn from a Dirichlet prior distribution over the three values of
H ′ that puts more mass on the probability of healthier states (com-
pared to the current health state) if the required resources are ob-
tained, but more mass on the probability of sicker states if the dis-
ease is more critical. More precisely, defineωH ∼ Dir(αH(d, r))
whereαH is a triple of values overH = {healthy, sick, critical}
and |ωH | = 1. If all the required resources are r = had in r, then
αH(d, r) = (12, 4cd, 2cd). If all required resources are either
r = had, or r = have, then αH(d, r) = (12, 4cd, 4cd). Finally,
if all the resources are needed, then αH(d, r) = (4, 4cd, 10cd).
For all the other values of r, i.e. the ones with partial resources
needed, we define αH(d, r) = (4, 10cd, 10cd). Now for sampling
purposes, we use these Dirichlet priors as parameters of multino-
mial distributions to sample the progression of health state. We
have assumed similar progression of health over health states for
all possible transitions based on ωH : (ωH,1, ωH,2, ωH,3). Thus,
ΩH ≡ P (h′|h, r) =
 (ωH,1, ωH,2, ωH,3) if h = sick(ωH,1, ωH,3, ωH,2) if h = healthy(ωH,2, ωH,1, ωH,3) if h = critical
where ωH,i is the ith element of ωH .
Resource obtention model: For each simulated agent, ΛR is
drawn from a Dirichlet prior distribution over the three values of
R′ that puts more mass on the probability of getting a resource if it
is the next in the medical pathway, and if the patient is more sick
(so their regret and bids will be larger, making it more likely they
will get the resource). However, the probability mass shifts towards
not getting a resource as N gets larger (so the more agents in the
system, the less likely it is to get a resource). Recall from above
that this model is meant to summarize the joint actions of N other
agents, as would have been modeled in a full dec-POMDP solu-
tion. An adequate summary is important for good performance,
and while we do not claim that the following prior is optimal, we
believe it to be a good representation for these simulations. Ideally
this function would be computed from the complete model directly,
or learned from data. We define ΛR ∼ Dir(αr(N,h, r)) where
αr is a triple of values over R = {have, had, need}. We define
ν′(h) = (1, 5, 10) for h = (healthy, sick, critical). If all re-
sources in r are either had or have, thenαr = (10ν′(h), ν′(h), N).
If the previous resource in the medical pathway is need, thenαr =
(ν′(h), 5ν′(h), 10N). Finally, if all resources are needed, then
αr = (ν
′(h), ν′(h), N).
Reward function: Φ(h, h′) is fixed for all the agents, and re-
wards agents for becoming healthy, but penalizes them for stay-
ing sick or going to the critical state. More precisely: for h′ =
(healthy, sick, critical), Φ(h = healthy, h′) = (10,−5,−10),
Φ(h = sick, h′) = (15, 0,−5), and Φ(h = critical, h′) =
(5, 0,−5). Further, once an patient is healthy and has received
all resources, they are discharged and receive no further reward.
4.2 Results
We ran each of the benchmarks on a machine with 3.4GHz Quad-
Core AMD and 4GB RAM available. We compare our auction-
based coordinated MDP approach with (AucMDP-RegIter) and with-
out (AucMDP-Reg) iteration using the expected regret bidding mech-
anism. We also compare to a version where agents only bid their
expected values, not regrets (AucMDP-Iter), FCFS, sickest-first,
and sample-based (UCT). Each simulated patient is randomly as-
signed a condition profile and then an MDP model with parameters
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Figure 2: Evaluation of various approaches based on expected regret (AucMDP-Reg), expected value with iteration (AucMDP-Iter), expected
regret with iteration (AucMDP-RegIter), and UCT with R = 4, D = 4. (a): Timeout is 300 seconds, τ = 10N (b): Timeout is 120 seconds,
τ = 10N
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Figure 3: (a) Scaling to 30 agents, UCT with 10mins timeout and τ = 20, R = 4, D = 4 (b) Increasing required resources (actions), UCT
with 60 seconds timeout and N = 6
randomly drawn from the Dirichlet distributions defined above is
assigned. 100 trials are done for each randomly drawn set of con-
ditions and MDPs, and this is repeated 10 times. For the UCT
results, we ran 10 trials, also repeated 10 times.
We present means and standard deviations over these simula-
tions. We first present results with 4 total resources types and each
agent requiring 4 resources based on randomly assigned condition
profiles (Figure 2a). The y-axis is the average reward per patient
gathered over an entire trial. We use a horizon that depends on
the number of agents (τ = 10N ), and UCT is given a 300 sec-
ond timeout. The total computation time of the complete alloca-
tions for the AucMDP approach is less than 10 seconds for prob-
lems with 10 agents, and this computation time increases linearly
with the number of agents and resources (as opposed to exponential
growth in the MMDP case). We can see that the two AucMDP it-
erative approaches perform similarly, and outperform the heuristic
approaches for N > 6. UCT is given sufficient time to outperform
all other approaches.
Figure 2b shows the performance of our approach in a more re-
alistic scenario with timeout set to a maximum of 120 seconds for
rollouts. Similarly, each agent requires 4 resources. When the num-
ber of agents increases to more than 8 agents, UCT underperforms
compared to AucMDP, providing a policy as inferior as FCFS or
sickest-first. This is mostly due to the fact that the number of pos-
sible actions grows exponentially by adding more agents, and thus,
UCT requires significantly more rollouts in the action exploration
phase. Figure 3a shows a further scaling toN = 30, again showing
that our AucMDP approach outperforms the other methods for the
larger problems. The number of joint actions also grows exponen-
tially when the number of resources required by each agent is in-
creased, since there are more individual options, but our AucMDP
handles this well as a result of linear growth in the number of ac-
tions (Figure 3b).
As more resources are added into the system, the performance
of approaches such as FCFS and sickest-first get closer to our ap-
proach because more diverse sets of resources are defined by con-
dition profiles. Figure 4a denotes that introducing more resources
yields more diversity in resource requirements: the allocation prob-
lem becomes “easier” to solve (fewer conflicts of interest), i.e., the
smaller number of resources results in harder allocation. Figure 4b
shows results of further scaling our AucMDP approach to 50 agents
each requiring 10 resources with 10 condition profiles.
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Figure 4: (a) Varying total resource types R = 20, D = 5, N = 10, more diversity in resource requirements results in fewer resource
conflicts, (b) Scaling our auction-based coordination approach to N = 50, R = 10, D = 10: Comparison with traditionally practiced
heuristic methods in healthcare.
5. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
Our approach to coordinating MDPs contrasts with those of mul-
tiagent MDPs [5] and dec-MDPs [9] in finding exact solutions,
which face complexity problems for large-scale problems such as
ours [3]. Instead, we offer an approximation method that collapses
the state space of each agent down to only features that are available
locally, and uses averaged effects of other agents for coordination.
This is similar in spirit to [4] where effects of actions are estimated
by agents (but without the central coordination, as in our work).
Our approach to resource allocation assumes additive utility in-
dependence, as in [13], and has state and action spaces decomposed
into sets of features, with each feature relevant to only one subtask,
but for cooperative settings, to maximize global utility. The use
of auctions to coordinate local preferences through MDPs is also
proposed in [8] where individual MDPs are submitted to a central
decision maker to eventually solve the winner determination prob-
lem through a mixed integer linear program (MILP). However, this
model only provides one-shot allocations and is not applicable to
environments with dynamic agents or resources. Multiple alloca-
tion phases are addressed in [20], but the solution incurs greater
communication overload with full agent preferences being mod-
eled. Both approaches require a full preference model of all agents
and their MDPs to be submitted to the auctioneer, which increases
the computation effort on the side of the auctioneer for solving an
MMDP and requires complicated (and often large) communication
overload while raising privacy concerns. The work of [12] also ad-
dresses cooperative scenarios using auctions for allocating tasks to
agents with fixed types and no individual preference models. How-
ever, we employ a multi-round mechanism to assign multiple re-
sources to dynamic agents, with expected regret dictating winner
determination.
The problem of medical resource allocation is perhaps best ad-
dressed to date by [17, 18] which also integrates a health-based
utility function to address fairness based on the severity of health
states. This model does not, however, consider temporal depen-
dency when determining allocations and our approach of consid-
ering future events provides a broader consideration of possible
uncertainty. Markov decision processes have been used to model
elective (non-emergency) patient scheduling in [15].
In all, our auction-based MDP approach addresses dynamic allo-
cation of resources using multiagent stochastic planning, employ-
ing an auction mechanism to converge fast with low communica-
tion cost. Our experiments demonstrate effectiveness in achieving
global utility, using regret, for large-scale medical applications.
Future work includes exploring auction-coordinated POMDPs [4]
to estimate resource demands, and learning resource models from
data. We are also interested in studying combinatorial bidding
mechanisms [7, 19], and bidding languages [14] in order to opti-
mize allocations based on richer preferences. Online mechanisms
and dynamic auctions [16] may also be of value to consider, to con-
tinue to explore changing environments.
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